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Genetic Modification of Animals

W

e speak about genetic modification when one or more genes
(DNA-molecules with a certain function within the cell or
organism) or combinations of DNA-molecules (so-called
gene-constructs) are introduced into the animal involved.
One method which is often used is that the DNA-molecules are injected
with a very fine needle in the fertilized egg. We speak about transgenic
animals when the genes come from a different species. This method may
be used for different purposes: to increase production in animal
husbandry, to make animals resistant to diseases, or to change animals
in such a way that they produce certain medically useful products in
their milk. Once the genetically modified animals are developed they
may also be multiplied by cloning techniques.

Mice are used to a great extent nowadays in biomedical research to
study the function of human genes, especially in connection with their
role in human diseases. The animals are manipulated in order to use
them as research models. For this purpose genes may also be ‘knocked
out’, to see what happens or, when they are not functioning well, to
replace them by other genes. The techniques of genetic modification are
potentially very powerful techniques, especially if combined with other
reproductive techniques such as in vitrofertilization, the freezing and
transportation of embryos, embryo transplantation, etc. Economic
competition and the curiosity of the scientists drives this technique
forward, and it is not surprising that many people are concerned about
these developments. In the beginning of the so-called recombinant-DNA
debate in the seventies, the emphasis was on safety issues (the safety of
human beings). In connection with plants it is the deliberate release of
genetically modified plants into the environment, and the ecological
risks of doing so which attracts attention. When we come to animals and
human beings the main concern is of an ethical nature.
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Ethical Aspects
In the public discussion about genetic modification of animals in the
Netherlands the concept of the 'intrinsic value' of animals plays an
important role. According to many authors in the field of animal ethics
only a particular class of sentient animals, with the capacity to suffer
pain, have an intrinsic value. I have called this a zoocentric moral view
on animals. 1 In the zoocentric view a comparison is made with human
beings, where the concept of intrinsic value has been in use for a long
time. Certain human experiences (of freedom, or pleasure) are said to be
of intrinsic value when this value can not be derived from any higher
value. Similarly zoocentric ethicists argue that what sentient (vertebrate)
animals and human beings have in common is that they can experience
pleasure and pain in a more or less conscious way, and therefore
animals have (experiences of) intrinsic value as well. This zoocentric
view is a well established view, in the sense that in many countries laws
for the protection of animals are based on it. In animal experimentation
laws for instance, the main emphasis is on the prevention of the
suffering of animals.
Those who stick to this zoocentric view follow the same kind of
reasoning with respect to the genetic modification of animals. Bernard
Rollin is a good example. 2 According to Rollin genetic engineering must
be seen as a morally neutral tool. Morality comes in when the animals
suffer as a result of genetic engineering. A consequence of this theory of
animal ethics is that Rollin sees no moral problems with adapting
animals to the system of intensive animal husbandry by means of
genetic manipulation, for instance through the modification of an
animal's instinctive needs or the reduction of stress. As long as the
animal has a certain need, it may suffer when it cannot fulfil this need,
but when we can take away the need through genetic engineering there
will be no suffering.

H. Verhoog, ‘The concept of intrinsic value and transgenic animals.’ Journal of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, 5/2, (1992), pp.147-160.
2 B.E. Rollin, ‘The Frankenstein thing: the moral impact of genetic engineering of
agricultural animals on society and future science’, in Genetic Engineering of Animals. An
Agricultural Perspective, eds. J.W. Evans and A. Hollaender (Plenum, New York, 1986),
pp.285-297; B.E. Rollin, The Frankenstein syndrome. Ethical and social issues in the genetic
engineering of animals (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995). (Editor’s note:
See review in Animal Issues, 1/1, 1997.)
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Many people feel an intuitive resistance to this view; they think that the
housing system should be adapted to the needs or characteristic 'nature'
of the animal and not the other way around. I argued against Rollin 3
that in order to determine whether animals are suffering, or that their
wellbeing is disturbed, we usually refer to the animal’s species-specific
needs. When we allow unrestricted manipulation of these needs, we
might loose the only yardstick we have to determine whether the
animal is suffering or not.
A way to accommodate this intuitive resistance is to rethink the concept
of intrinsic value. The original meaning is that an animal has a value of
its own, independent of any instrumental value an animal may also
have for man. To respect animals for their own sake, we have to
transcend the utility relationship and emphasize their relative
independence ('autonomy'), their species-specific nature and their
integrity. In Rollin's view it is not the nature of the animal itself which
matters, but the actually felt experiences related to the satisfaction or
frustration of the needs involved in the having of such a nature. I hold
that the characteristic nature itself, the species-specific characteristic
way of being of an animal (its 'essence'), matters morally. To argue for
this position one has to emphasize the role of the philosophy of nature
in connection with (animal) ethics 4.

The Moral Relevance of ‘Naturalness’
In the present intellectual climate the very idea that the 'naturalness' of
something has moral significance needs further clarification. To say that
naturalness has moral significance suggests that we derive norms and
values from nature, and this is seen by many people as an example of
the so-called 'naturalistic fallacy'. In short, this fallacy says that the
‘ought’ (what we ought to do) can not be derived from the ‘is’ (factual
statements about reality, about nature).

H. Verhoog, ‘Ethics and genetic engineering of animals’ in Morality, Worldview and
Law eds. A. W. Mussjchenga et al (Van Gorcum, Assen), 1992, pp.267-278.
4 In a recent analysis of the public debate about genetic engineering of animals, aiming
at a research agenda of important ethical question, one of the questions which came
out was: ‘What are the implications of the attitudes towards the naturalness and
natural values for policy on the genetic modification of animals and the ethical
weighing procedure required for that policy?’. J. Vorstenbosch and L. van Voorthuisen
Ethiek, politiek en genetische modificatie van dieren (Netherlands Office of Technology
Assessment, The Hague, 1992).
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I would like to discuss this question of the naturalistic fallacy in the
context of the meta-ethical question how we can know that a certain
human action is morally good, how we can justify it. In philosophical
ethics any appeal to a human or divine authority is not acceptable. It is
said that the human moral agent should come to an autonomous, free
judgement, and the reasons for coming to this judgement must be
public. An appeal to one’s personal feelings or one’s intuition is not
enough.
A judgement can only be free when it is not forcefully imposed upon
oneself. To morally legitimate one’s actions by appealing to nature or
natural laws (‘it is good because it is in agreement with natural laws, or
because it is natural’) is problematic because it overlooks the freedom of
human beings. Our behaviour may, in a third-person perspective, be
influenced by many ‘outside’ factors (genetic, physiological, social), but
in a first-person perspective the experience of freedom is basic. On that
basis we expect from people (not from animals) that they can account
for their moral decisions; we hold them responsible for their choices.
Holding people responsible for their behaviour would be senseless
without the principle of freedom. When we say that people behave the
way they do because it is encoded in their genes or ingrained in their
brains, or because it is their ‘nature’ to act that way, this statement can
be interpreted in two ways. In the third-person perspective it can be
seen as a particular explanation of behaviour. When used in a firstperson perspective, as a moral justification of one’s behaviour (‘I had to
do it, I had no choice because it is in my genes’), then it is a case of a
naturalistic fallacy. We also speak about biological or genetic
determinism in this context.
The meta-ethical reason why we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’, or
values from facts, is not primarily a logical problem, but has to do with
the difference between a first-person perspective based on our
immediate experience and a third-person perspective in which human
behaviour is described and/or explained from outside. A philosophicalanthropological theory must include the idea of freedom and morality
as one of the basic characteristics of the human species, of being human.
A consequence for normative ethics is that what we ought to do (as
opposed to what is) refers to something which is not yet there, an
unrealized potential or goal, which might be realized in the future if we
want it. Values are involved in all human behaviour. They are not
derived from the facts of nature; they are signposts pointing into the
future.
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Normative valuation, pointing out what we ought to strive after,
always involves both a human being as subject and an object which is
valued. When the focus is on the human being, the object valued is said
to have an instrumental value. It is instrumental/contributive to the
realisation of an intrinsic value of human beings. When, in valuation,
the human being is focusing on the object for its own sake (because it
has a good of its own), then the intrinsic value of the object is
emphasized. The relation is non-instrumental in this case.
The attribution of intrinsic value to an object is a free human decision in
the sense that we are not in any way forced to make the attribution by
our own nature. This also is the case when the object is a human being.
That animals by (logical) necessity must have intrinsic value, or ought to
be given intrinsic value because of certain facts about their nature, is not
the case either. This does not mean that no reasons can be given why
animals are appropriate objects of moral concern; I can try to make it
plausible to someone who in the first instance does not believe it. One
reason could be the fact that we usually deal with domestic animals who
are to a smaller or larger degree dependent on human beings. Looking
at them from a (socio)-ecological perspective we might say that we have
made them a part of the human community. When they suffer because
of our treatment we are responsible for this. When talking about wild
animals we might be impressed by their relative autonomy, by the
evolutionary wisdom or (God’s) creativity expressed in the animal’s
form and behaviour. Who are we in nature that we have the right to use
animals for any purpose we like? The attribution of intrinsic value
comes down to a human decision about which entities we want to bring
into the moral domain.
In the anthropocentric view non-human living entities are not included
in the moral domain, and therefore their intrinsic value is not
acknowledged. They only have an instrumental value. In the zoocentric
view only those natural entities are included in the moral domain which
have conscious experiences (sentient animals). In the biocentric view all
living beings can have both instrumental and intrinsic value for human
beings.
When it is correct to say that attributing intrinsic value to animals or
other organisms is a normative decision, then having intrinsic value is
dependent on and inseparable from the act of moral valuation. It is only
after the decision has been made that animals have a good-of-their-own,
that the characteristic nature of the animal becomes morally relevant.
When we take animals from the natural environment to which they are
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adapted and bring them into a human environment, then it is our
knowledge of the ‘nature’ of the animals which must guide us in finding
out what the animals need for their well-being. On the basis of this
knowledge certain standards or norms can be established for keeping
animals.

Cartesian dualism and ‘Naturalness’
Also important in our consideration of the relation between facts and
values is the Cartesian dualism associated with modern natural science.
Many of the confusions inherent in discussions about morality and
nature are due to this Cartesian dualism between man, defined as
'subject' (res cogitans) and nature, defined as 'object' (res extensa).
Epistemologically we can say that the acquisition of knowledge by
necessity presupposes a distinction between a knowing subject and an
object to be known. In this distinction the object may be something we
experience as being outside of us (a table, another person, a flower, etc.),
but it may just as well be an inner experience which may become the
object of our knowledge. This epistemological distinction, based upon
our direct experience (first-person perspective) does not say anything
about the nature of the object perceived. The problems with Cartesian
dualism do not arise if interpreted in this epistemological sense. The
problems crop up when it is interpreted as an ontological distinction
between two completely distinct and unrelated worlds, res cogitans and
res extensa.
The ontological distinction is at the very basis of modern natural
science, where nature is tacitly defined as res extensa, and where it is
seen as the task of science to discover the 'objective' laws of nature,
which are seen as totally independent of our 'subjective' (personal)
experiences of the world. It is then, that the domain of values and the
domain of facts become two completely separate domains. As subject,
the human being stands outside nature. Rationality, self-consciousness
and freedom are seen as characteristics of the human subject, and to
attribute these qualities to nature, as res extensa, is considered to be
anthropomorphism.
Also moral valuation is seen as a typical characteristic of the subject, as
'subjective'. Values are then seen as a product of the human mind; they
are not found in nature as res extensa. It is believed to be the explicit
task of natural science to discover the primary, objective qualities or
6

properties of nature. They are supposed to tell us what is 'real',
independent of the world as it is experienced by the human subject.
In such an ontologically interpreted dualistic framework it becomes
logically impossible to derive values from facts, ought from is. Notice
that 'facts' and 'is' do not refer to nature as directly experienced by man,
as part of his life-world, but to the impoverished nature of res extensa,
devoid of any subjective qualities. This is what Kass 5 refers to when he
says that 'our natural science is, quite deliberately, most 'unnatural'. The
gap between nature studied scientifically and life lived naturally is seen
by him as the result of the deliberate choice of modernscience for
'objectivity'.
In his book 'The phenomenon of life' Jonas 6 says:
The contention -almost axiomatic in the modern climate of
thought- that something like an "ought" can issue only
from man and is alien to everything outside him, is more
than a descriptive statement: it is part of a metaphysical
position which has never given full account of itself.
If the Cartesian dualism underlying modern science is a 'deliberate
choice', not being itself the result of our understanding of the world, but
an assumption which defines a particular way of looking at the world,
then the question arises whether we could make a different choice. Jonas
looked for what he called a reunion between the subjective and the
objective. He believed that the realisation of such a reunion could only
be effected from the objective end, through a revision of the idea of
'nature', postulating a continuity, rather than a duality between mind
and nature. In the dualistic view ethics belongs to the subjective side,
without any objective foundation. When a continuity between mind and
nature is postulated, ethics could be conceived as part of the philosophy
of nature, grounded in 'an objective assignment of the nature of things'.
In the tradition of Whitehead, Jonas, like several other 'organicist
philosophers', 7 refuses to interpret the world as a purely material
mechanism, driven forward by efficient causes, devoid of any
subjectivity, mind or inwardness. In Jonas's philosophy of nature man's
L.R. Kass, Toward a more natural science. Biology and Human Affairs (The Free Press,
New York, 1985), Preface, p.ix.
6 H. Jonas, The phenomenon of life (Harper and Row, New York, 1966), p.283.
7 We can think here of the work of several European continental scientistsphilosophers, such as Goethe, Portmann, Buytendijk, Viktor von Weizsacker, Plessner
and others. Some of these are introduced by Marjorie Grene in Approaches to a
philosophical biology, (Basic Books, New York, 1968).
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subjectivity has become a part of nature; it is no longer alien to nature,
as it is when nature is interpreted as res extensa.
What is appearing in man's consciousness, thoughts about nature for
instance, can now be seen as far less estranged from nature than in the
Cartesian dualistic view. The epistemological point that thoughts about
nature arise in human consciousness and depend on our own activity,
can not be denied however. What is denied is that the 'content' of these
thoughts necessarily comes from man only and not from what is going
on in nature. The same could be true with respect to values, and in
particular with the intrinsic value of animals. When you look at an
animal as a Cartesian object in an anthropocentric context, you may not
be able to discover its intrinsic value. You have to see the animal in a
more phenomenological way as a being with subject-character as well,
with whom we can communicate (we may call this a second-person
perspective). As they sometimes say in environmental ethics: by really
participating in nature in a deep-ecological way, natural entities can
become partners of whom we learn that they have a good of their own.
By learning this and by listening to what they have to tell us, respect for
them arises in a self-evident way.

The Role of Philosophies of Nature
We have come to the conclusion that in a biocentric view the
characteristic ‘nature’ of the animals involved has become a morally
relevant category. We have also seen that one’s philosophy of nature
affects one’s view of the relation between facts and values. The role of
philosophies of nature also comes to the fore in another way. Some
biologists might argue that speaking about the characteristic or essential
nature of an organism refers to an outdated, typological way of looking
at animal species. And, when it is not possible to define what is
specifically ‘good’ for the animal, does not also the concept of intrinsic
value become implausible? As an illustration I would like to refer to an
article by Mauron, 8 in which he criticizes the view put forward by
Jeremy Rifkin that ‘the crossing of species borders and the incorporation
of genetic traits from one species directly into the germ-line of another
species represents a fundamental assault on the principle of species
integrity and violates the right of every species to exist as a separate,
Alex Mauron, ‘Ethics and the ordinary molecular biologist’ in Scientists and their
responsbility eds. W.R. Shea and B. Sitter (Watson Publishing International, Canton,
1989), pp.249-265.
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identifiable creature’. Mauron points out that speaking about species as
separate, identifiable entities is 'essentialistic language', which is
incompatible with the anti-essentialist philosophical outlook immanent
in much of current biology after the Darwinian revolution. In this
philosophical outlook the emphasis is on competition between
individual organisms within populations.
To most biologists, Mauron says, the new technical opportunities to mix
genetic material from different sources, is a natural extension of the way
these biologists are trained to think about individuals, genomes and
species. Given the anti-essentialist philosophical outlook the
development of genetic engineering can be seen as a ‘logical
development’. To assume that there are inviolable species barriers he
considers to be wishful thinking; as humans we may want to establish
such barriers for ethical reasons, say between man and other animals,
but we cannot 'read' such barriers in the state of nature. To do so would
imply the use of an arbitrary concept of ‘naturality’. Mauron reaches the
following conclusion:
All this points to a form of naturalistic fallacy that often
muddles the discussion of genetic engineering and many
other issues concerning the impact of science on society. I
do not think that the "naturality" of an action has any
bearing on its ethical standing. Of course, many things that
are done under the guise of "respecting nature" are
valuable and well worth doing. Why not acknowledge
that they are so for man-centered reasons (improving his
safety or quality of life)? 9
I think that Mauron's reasoning is based on a number of doubtful
assumptions. First of all, to speak about 'species integrity' or to show
respect for the integrity of a species or the species-specific
characteristics, one need not necessarily believe in discontinuity or
constancy of types, which is considered by Mauron to be characteristic
of essentialism. The evolutionist Gould, 10 who cannot possibly be called
an 'essentialist', speaks about the integrity of animal species because of
their long evolutionary history. That the characteristics of species can
change over time is not the morally relevant point; also individual
organisms such as human beings, change over time, but this does not
affect their integrity. The point is that the constitutive characteristics of a
species are not just accidental ones, chosen by man to categorize a class
of more or less similar animals; the point is that they are the result of a
9

Ibid., p.255.
S.J. Gould, An urchin in the storm (Penguin, London, 1990).

10

9

long evolutionary process, which has led to a more or less harmoniously
balanced whole, in close relation with a particular environment. With
such a species-concept in mind, the interference with modern techniques
of genetic modification, thereby creating 'trans-genic' animals, might be
seen as an assault on the integrity of a species. The existence of species
barriers (no exchange of genetic material) between most species of
animals is an empirical fact, which has little to do with the idea that
species change over time.
The question now is, whether the existence of these empirical barriers
has any moral relevance for human behaviour with respect to these
animals. Mauron says that we may want to establish these barriers for
ethical reasons (thereby making them 'inviolable'), but we cannot 'read'
such barriers in the state of nature.
The last quotation clearly shows that Mauron holds an anthropocentric
view of nature. Within this view it is true by necessity that something
can only be valued by human beings for man-centred reasons. That all
valuation is a human activity does not imply that the content of the
valuation does only depend on a specific interest we as humans have in
the outcome of the valuation. In a zoocentric and biocentric view it is
possible for humans to value something for its own sake.
Finally I would like to say a few words about Mauron's interpretation of
the naturalistic fallacy. He says: 'I do not think that the "naturality" of an
action has any bearing on its ethical standing'. In connection with the
topic under discussion this is a very confusing statement. Rifkin did not
say that it is ‘unnatural’ to cross species barriers, and therefore we are
not allowed to do it. I am not sure what his reasons are for accepting the
principle of species integrity. He may have had philosophical or
religious reasons, but whatever the reasons, a naturalistic fallacy need
not be implied. In a non-anthropocentric normative theory for
establishing the moral quality of human behaviour with respect to
animals or nature, the principle of naturality plays a very important
role. Out of respect for the intrinsic value of an animal we ought to treat
animals, as much as possible, in such a way that we do not infringe
upon their species-specific characteristics; we should take into account
their 'characteristic nature'. In a biocentric view we are not talking
about the naturality of 'human action', but about the role in human
action of the nature of the object of human action.
Interesting in Mauron’s article is the acknowledgment of the antiessentialist philosophical outlook immanent in much of current (neo10

darwinian) biology. This does not mean, however, that essentialist
outlooks are totally lacking in modern biology. One example to the
contrary is Brian Goodwin, who is generally seen as a representative of
a structuralist approach within biology. Structuralism has been
portrayed by Resnik 11 as the rebirth of ‘rational morphology’, a kind of
typological thinking which dominated biology in the pre-darwinian
period. Goodwin 12 himself has described the conflict between
structuralism and neo-darwinism as a conflict between typological
thinking, which sees reality in an underlying nature/kind/type, and
population thinking, according to which the type is a human
abstraction, only the variation between the individuals is real.
Because of Goodwin’s structuralist philosophy of nature he is critical of
many aspects of genetically engineering plants and animals. In his paper
‘Species as natural kinds that express distinctive natures’ 13 he again
contrasts his approach with the neo-darwinistic one, according to which
species have arisen by historical contingency, through random genetic
variation and selection of the fitter variants. In Goodwin’s structuralist
approach species acquire a status that they do not have in Darwinism,
as natural kinds with distinctive natures. Such a view, he says, invites a
relationship to organisms that recognises their intrinsic qualities, so that
they are valued for their beings rather than simply for their utility.
In Goodwin’s book ‘How the leopard changed its spots’ 14 he says: ‘An
organism or a work of art expresses a nature and a quality that has
intrinsic value and meaning, with no purpose other than its own selfexpression’. Goodwin pleads for the need of a science of qualities, as
complementary to the traditional natural science of quantities.
For Goodwin it does not seem to be any problem to relate his
structuralist realist philosophy of biology with the idea of intrinsic
value. We can conclude that a biocentric normative theory seems to be
more plausible for a biologist adhering to a more holistic philosophy of
nature, whereas the molecular biologist Mauron uses a nominalist
David Resnik, ‘The rebirth of rational morphology: a process structuralism’s
philosophy of biology’, Acta Biotheoretica 42, (1994), pp.1-14.
11

G. Webster and B.C. Goodwin, ‘The origin of species: a structuralist approach’,
Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5, (1982), pp.15-47.
13 Brian Goodwin, ‘Species as natural kinds that express distinctive natures: the case for
a moratorium on deliberate release’ in Coping with deliberate release. The limits of risk
assessment, ed. A van Dommelen (International Centre for Human and Public Affairs,
Tilburg, 1996), pp.73-78.
14 B.C. Goodwin, How the leopard changed its spots. The evolution of complexity (Scribner’s
Sons, New York, 1994), Chapter 7.
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philosophy to legitimate his anthropocentric normative theory. This
brings me to the last part of my paper.

The ‘Unnaturalness’ of Modern Science
Let us return to Kass' statement that natural science is quite deliberately
most 'unnatural'. Kass pleads for a more ‘natural’ science, that is closer
to our immediate experience, whereas Wolpert 15 holds that ‘natural’
thinking, by which he means day-to-day common sense thinking, will
never give an understanding about the nature of things. Doing science
requires one to remove oneself from one’s personal experience, and he
mentions molecular biology to illustrate this. For Wolpert there is no
room for Kass’ more natural science or for Goodwin’s science of
qualities; it is science or nothing.
In contrast to Wolpert I think that within biology as a whole we have
scientific disciplines which are closer to our everyday experience of
nature and disciplines which are far away from it. When we enter a
modern scientific laboratory we discover very little of the 'nature' as we
experience it in our everyday life.
Biologists and historians of biology are well aware of the tension which
exists, since the nineteenth century in particular, between the naturalists
and the experimentalists. 16 It looks as if, on the eve of the coming 'age
of biotechnology' this tension is intensifying. There seems to be an
increasing gap between the study of nature as directly given in our lifeworld and a 'second nature' made in the laboratory. Transgenic
creatures first have to be 'made' before they can be studied.
To understand the ethical questions which have arisen in discussions
about the genetic engineering of animals it looks as if we have to pay
much more attention to the processes of transformation which take
place when nature as given becomes the object of experimental science.
This question has not received much attention in the philosophy of
science. It is only recently that sociologists of science and some
Lewis Wolpert, The unnatural nature of science (Faber and Faber, London, 1993).
Dobhansky speaks about the distinction between Cartesian and Darwinian aspects of
biology. It is sometimes expressed as the distinction between restricted sciences,
dealing with closed systems (usually in the laboratory) and unrestricted sciences,
dealing with open systems. Mertz and McCauley (Synthese 43/1, 1980) analyze the
differences between laboratory ecology and field ecology; field ecologists speaking
about the ‘unreality of laboratory research’.
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philosophers of science have started to pay attention to the role of the
experiment in creating a 'second nature', which is sometimes far
removed from the 'first nature' of our direct experience.
I would like to give one example which illustrates this development.
Michael Lynch 17 describes the transformation in experimental biology of
the 'naturalistic animal', the animal as we know it in our daily
experience, into the 'analytic animal' as object of natural science. He
describes how laboratory procedures assure the removal of the
characteristics which make up the naturalistic animal; the result is an
artefact. In the laboratory, phenomena are created and perpetuated,
which could never have arisen in nature.
Could it be that molecular biologists such as Mauron can not accept the
moral relevance of the concept of naturality, because they are no longer
dealing with given nature, because their work has become totally
'unnatural'? If reductionistic experimental molecular biology is
constructing a second nature in the laboratory, then the 'objective facts'
of the molecular biologist can be seen as the final result of a process of
transformation of nature, taking place in the laboratory. In experimental
science 'objectivity' is more and more loosing the meaning it has for the
naturalist (describing and explaining nature as directly given in our
experience); objectivity is defined as reproducibility of results and in
biology this can usually only be obtained under laboratory conditions.
Reproducibility is a necessary condition for the application of
knowledge in technology.
This view upon science goes very much against the view of
positivistically inclined scientists such as Wolpert, who believe that the
science which abstracts from our direct experience of nature is
describing nature as it 'really' is (primary qualities), the 'objective facts',
totally devoid of any subjectivity. According to more relativistic
philosophers and sociologists of science, these facts of the laboratory
must be seen as products (constructs) of human thinking and
experimentation. Facts are not simply given in experimental science,
they are always the result of specific interpretations of what is
perceived.
According to such a non-positivistic analysis there are good reasons to
believe that the experimentally transformed second nature of the
molecular biologist is not value-free. It may not just be describing nature
M.E. Lynch, ‘Sacrifice and the transformation of the animal body into a scientific
object’, Social Studies of Science, 18, (1988).
17

13

'objectively' ('true' to the object), but transforming it on the basis of a
very specific design. The experimental design in biotechnology is based
on a specific anthropocentric attitude towards nature: interfering in
nature in order to gain control over nature. We could even say that the
nominalistic concept of nature of some of the more extreme defenders of
relativism provides a perfect legitimation for genetically engineering
nature. If nature is no more than a human construct, then there is
nothing in nature itself preventing us from reconstructing it, nothing of
intrinsic value, withholding us from disturbing the integrity of either
individual organisms or, indirectly, of the species to which they belong.
And ultimately, why should we refrain from the patenting of transgenic
organisms when such organisms are seen as human inventions, as
artefacts, which did not exist before the interference of the genetic
engineer? Arnim von Gleich 18 gives a good characterisation of the
classical ideal of the 'hard' sciences, versus that of the 'soft' sciences.
Hard sciences are reductionistic, experimental sciences, characterised by
various forms of abstraction, quantification etc. and aiming at
intervention in and control over nature. Very different are the ideals of
the 'soft' sciences, which stay much closer to the life-world as
experienced by man. The mechanistic concept of nature is replaced here
by an organismic one; methodical reductionism is replaced by a holistic
approach and experimentation is taken as a dialogue with nature, and
not as a subordination of nature. 'Soft' for von Gleich does not have the
negative inclination it usually has within the community of natural
scientists.

Conclusion
In experimental reductionistic science we see a progressive
transformation of given nature, as directly experienced in our lifeworld, to a second or more or less artificial nature. In this process the
qualitative aspects of nature, which are so evident in our life-world, are
lost sight of. The more science is impregnated with instrumental values,
the more difficult it becomes to see the intrinsic value of nature. There is
an inbuilt tension between the very process of objectifying nature,
demanded by the ontological interpretation of Cartesian dualism, and
the idea that animals (or nature) have intrinsic value. The realm of
values and the realm of knowledge get divorced from each other.

Armin von Gleich, Der wissenschaftliche Umgang mit der Natur. (Campus Verlag,
Frankfurt, 1989).
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The word 'intrinsic' is closely related to the word 'essence' or 'essential',
the characteristic nature of something. The anti-essentialism of modern
(molecular) biology may be needed for greater control over the
processes of life but, in a time of increasing alienation from nature and
environmental catastrophes, it always has to be balanced by more
holistic approaches. The moral relevance of 'naturality' can more easily
be experienced in our direct sensorial contact with nature. With the
more phenomenological method of von Gleich's soft science, or
Goodwin’s science of qualities, we can deepen this experience. The
'qualitative' knowledge which results from the application of this
method is very much needed for the evaluation of modern
biotechnology, and to redress the exaggerated claims of molecular
biologists, of which Mauron is only one example.
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